Abstract: Armed actors are often involved in electoral politics, from the fusing of ballots and bullets in armed political parties to insurgents covertly backing politicians. This article develops new concepts and theory to better understand these complex relationships between violent actors and democratic practice. It first offers a novel conceptualization of armed groups' electoral strategies that systematically maps out variation in the organizational directness and public openness of groups' involvement in elections. The article then uses comparative case studies to develop theory about the conditions under which each of these electoral strategies is most likely, and what can trigger changes between them. The interaction of armed groups' power and expectations of popular support with governments' policies of toleration or repression determines the strategies of electoral participation that groups pursue. These concepts and arguments lay the foundation for a systematic research agenda on when and how "normal" and armed politics become intertwined.
Introduction
Violence and elections are not strangers to one another: party armed wings clash, party supporters riot, incumbents target opposition parties, and insurgents attack politicians. 1 Political scientists have explored when and how violence erupts, the ways in which politicians coerce, and the consequences of violence for outcomes such as electoral results. Yet this research often focuses on how mainstream political actors engage with elections and violence. Armed actors themselves generally are given little agency, instead being primarily portrayed as manipulated and controlled by elites.
We argue instead that armed groups pursue a surprisingly diverse array of electoral strategies. Some groups choose nonparticipation, ignoring electoral politics or not trying the shift the balance of electoral outcomes. But many -perhaps most -armed groups seek to use electoral politics, rather than simply being manipulated by electoral actors. 2 We identify four distinct strategies of electoral participation by armed groups. They differ along two dimensions: first, directness, i.e. whether or not armed groups run their own candidates in elections; and, second, openness, i.e. whether or not the armed group makes official statements expressing electoral positions publicly. These strategies include openly fusing bullets and ballots to form an armed political party, covertly controlling a political wing that stands candidates in elections, overtly targeting particular parties or politicians, and secretly providing resources to organizationallydistinct political parties.
After laying out this new typology, we explore why groups pursue different strategies.
These insights are based on theory-building case studies covering broad geographical and temporal scope. Groups that expect to do relatively well in elections and see opportunities to shift policy in their direction by doing so pursue direct participation. Governments vary, however, in their tolerance of overt, direct participation. When open involvement is blocked, groups that see advantages from direct participation choose to build formally distinct party structures that they nevertheless control; this covert direct participation seeks to evade legal bans and popular backlash.
Groups that do not expect to do well in elections, by contrast, tend to pursue indirect methods of involvement, by backing or targeting specific parties, politicians, and even voters that they do not control. They hope to change electoral outcomes to favor existing political actors, based on the closeness of their policy preferences to these actors in mainstream politics. They tend to covertly support parties to avoid legal and public opinion backlash that would undermine both the armed group and even the party. Armed groups are more likely to overtly target parties and politicians who oppose the group's goals, since overt opposition to a party is not likely to trigger the legal bans and public responses that open support for a party could.
What explains nonparticipation? We suggest that groups choose not to participate through any of these strategies when the political cleavages, or the elections themselves, do not provide an opening for advancing a group's goals by selectively favoring or undermining parties in the system. As a result, ideologically radical groups and marginal peripheral actors are most likely to ignore electoral politics, simply not engaging to affect electoral outcomes, or even at times indiscriminately targeting the whole electoral system and all political actors, rather than trying to tilt the playing field in a particular direction. This can be politically consequential, but has a different significance than efforts to "game" electoral politics.
This is a concept-and theory-building article that does not claim to provide causally identified tests. However, it uses examples intentionally chosen from different contexts, within the scope conditions we identify, to show that the concepts can broadly be operationalized and to provide illustrative evidence of the mechanisms identified in the argument. We show that electoral strategies can be distinguished from one another and from nonparticipation. This article lays the basis for future systematic empirical research on both the causes and consequences of armed group electoral participation.
Existing Work on Elections and Violence
Research on elections and violence has expanded rapidly in recent years, providing many insights, but it has mainly focused on the use of violence by existing political parties. New work has begun to examine particular types of armed group electoral participation, 3 but we argue that researchers have not yet explored the distinctive ways that armed groups get involved in electoral politics.
First, there is rich literature on violence around elections. This work examines violence both before and after elections, which often includes violent protests, violence against supporters of one side or another at the polls, and even more generalized communal violence. 4 Most of these studies focus on politicians' decisions on how to manipulate or use violent actors, ranging from community and student organizations to rebel groups to criminal actors and mercenaries. This research also involves discussions of state repression around elections, whether directly or through non-state proxies. 5 McAdam and Tarrow have argued that this work can further include the interaction of "contentious politics" and electoral campaigns. 6 Second, a subset of these studies addresses the decision by preexisting electoral parties to develop their own armed wings or to cultivate links with violent actors. 7 These cases, such as the Awami National Party in Bangladesh and the KANU in Kenya, obviously deserve attention, but they continue to focus on party and national political elites' decisions to manipulate, unleash, or crack down on armed groups.
A third strand of research provides more agency to armed groups as they engage with elections. It studies peace deals and the subsequent transformation of combatants into peaceful political parties. 8 For instance, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in El Salvador, the Maoists in Nepal, Renamo in Mozambique, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East
Timor, and the Uganda National Liberation Army transitioned from war-fighting organizations into purely electoral actors embedded within mainstream politics.
Is Armed Group Electoral Participation a Separate Phenomenon?
In many studies, electoral participation is framed as part of a process that inevitably produces moderation such that participating groups stop using violence. For example, Marina Ottaway writes that "there is ample evidence that participation in an electoral process forces any party, regardless of ideology, to moderate its position if it wants to attract voters in large numbers and avoid a backlash." 9 If that were the case, the logic of electoral participation could be very similar to that of peace deals and subsequently transformed rebel parties.
Using new data from Matanock, 10 we find that a significant number of armed groups use electoral and armed strategies simultaneously for long periods, and that many of them never moderate in the sense of ending their armed attacks, even in the cases in which they are most likely to do so. These data measure what we call "direct" participation: armed groups standing candidates eligible under the state's rules in elections, either through their own party or a publicly-identified party wing. 11 They encompass both overt and some covert direct participation, under our typology, but not indirect participation, for which data are not currently available. 12 These data code a set of groups as "compet[ing] against the government without a peace agreement in place" and "typically actively attack[ing] during the electoral process," in contrast to those that participate following a signed settlement or a win where then only the victor participates. Just over a fifth of the groups that participate directly do so in this way, suggesting that this is an important phenomenon. 13 We do not find evidence that electoral participation is a waystation to demobilization.
Across the 21 cases of violent participation, we find that demobilization eventually occurred in a handful of these cases (6), one group stopped using both tactics at the same time, and another handful of cases still used both tactics at the end of the period examined and do could demobilize at some point (4) (see Table 1 ). What is most striking across all of the groups in these sets, however, is that they continued to use violence while participating for 2.67, 4, and 3.25 election years, respectively. Most of these elections are between four and six years apart, so these groups are often operating simultaneous electoral and armed campaigns for 15-20 years on average.
Among these are the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), which began participating through its armed wing, Sinn Fein, in 1983 but did not sign onto a settlement until 1998; and, Hezbollah, which has been participating in elections since 1992 without any sign of moving toward a settlement. The dominant trajectory, however, among groups using direct participation, is continuous armed campaigns that outlast the use of electoral strategies (10).
These include groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which participated briefly in the 1980s but soon returned to conflict. We cannot treat electoral strategies as a straightforward waystation on the path to a peace deal: rather than being a solution to conflict, electoral strategies are often another means of waging war. Groups that stopped participating and using violence simultaneously 1 5% 4 Groups still employing both tactics 4 19% 3.25 Groups still using violence when they stopped participating 10 48% 1.9
Scope Conditions
Considering armed actors are not necessarily the pawns of existing politicians, and they do not just participate as a path to a settlement, how then do they navigate elections? There are excellent studies of specific cases, 14 but little overarching conceptual and theoretical development around this question. Seeking to develop a systematic understanding of armed group electoral participation, we limit the study within several scope conditions. First, we focus on groups that begin as actors with coercive capacity that continue to be armed as they engage with elections.
Some may abandon arms over time, but are armed at the time of initial electoral involvement.
We pursue this focus for several reasons: a significant subset of armed groups conduct simultaneous violent and electoral campaigns, as described with data on direct participation above; these armed groups likely follow a different logic than those that have agreed to participate as part of a peace settlement, for example; and we know much less about these armed groups than those that pursue elections after demobilization. Our case examples also focus on the choices of armed groups rather than the choices of existing political parties because these choices are at least plausibly theoretically distinct. 15 Our groups originate outside the electoral arena, and face the choice of how to engage with it. This represents a fairly clear break from the traditional focus on political party choices about using violence, or rebel choices about transforming into peaceful participants.
Second, we keep our focus on groups that at least formally avow a political goal. We define "armed actors" broadly as nongovernmental entities using extra-legal violence to achieve political aims related to the state or its governance. 18 We include some elections outside of purely free-and-fair contests, but domestic actors must expect that party participation in electoral politics can plausibly change policy directly.
Conceptualizing Electoral Strategies
All armed groups in these electoral systems are forced to consider the consequences of elections.
This section identifies five strategies armed groups can pursue in the context of elections. We provide case illustrations to show that electoral strategies can be operationalized across contexts, and distinguished from both one another and nonparticipation. 19 There is no indication that they hoped to tilt the playing field toward or away from any particular party; instead, they sought to undermine the government.
Participation. But many groups -and based on our wide range of cases, we suspect that this may be most groups -choose to instead seek to influence elections' outcome through some type of participation. Even anti-systemic armed groups can assess which politicians and parties are more or less likely to oppose them and their preferred policies. Groups with less radical goals are likely to see opportunities for both conflict and cooperation with mainstream electoral actors.
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Groups may want to defeat hardline political parties that oppose concessions, bolster politicians friendly to their goals, gain influence within mainstream politics without having to demobilize, and/or take advantage of the patronage available to political parties. This approach is far broader than scholars have previously conceptualized. 20 This variation is also subtler than existing empirical measures of armed group participation have captured: directly and overtly deploying candidates as part of an armed group-linked political party is the easiest to observe, but only one extreme of a much broader spectrum.
We identify four distinct strategies of armed group participation: Overt Direct, Covert Covert direct strategies involve an armed group controlling a formal political party while refusing to publicly acknowledge this organizational fusion. They can even falsely claim that an armed wing is a separate organization from a political wing, intentionally cultivating ambiguity and misinformation about the connection. We expect this strategy will not be common either, as we discuss below. But there are well-known examples of this strategy, including the PIRA and Sinn Fein, which we discuss below. The Basque terrorist group Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) and political parties including Batasuna in Spain had this relationship. The Sipahe-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and its armed wing, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi were also closely linked
together, yet tried to maintain a degree of public separation in 1990s Pakistani Punjab as the SSP pursued electoral power within Punjab's party system.
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Overt indirect strategies involve armed groups urging support for a distinct party or directing attacks against a party and its supporters. We argue below that this is most commonly a means of opposing a disliked party or politicians, but in rarer cases it can be a form of support.
We have identified a number of cases across a wide range of context to demonstrate that this 
Theorizing Electoral Strategies
We now explore why strategies are chosen. Our empirical strategy for this theory development relies on case studies, from across countries and time, of each type to show that the concepts can be broadly operationalized. 36 This is an exercise in creating theory, not testing it, so we do not presume to be proving causal effects. Indeed, the theory emerged in dialogue with case study research on Colombia, Northern Ireland, India, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan in particular. However, we are able to show that our concepts and variables can be measured and compared from across cases, to generate an initial logic of armed group participation, and to provide a plausibility probe using diverse case illustrations. Future theoretical and empirical research can expand on this base, exploring both the causes and consequences of armed group electoral participation.
We start with a static world in which an armed group is deciding on an initial strategy, and then explore change over time in a separate section below. We argue that three basic variables explain how these strategies play out: group expectations of electoral success alone and alongside a consideration of military capacity, government willingness to accept the formal involvement of the armed group in mainstream politics, and the alignment of political parties with the armed group's political goals. 
Explaining Varieties of Direct Participation
We first seek to understand choices among direct participation, and then consider why groups might choose nonparticipation (within our scope conditions). The relevant consideration is which kind of participation will best serve a group's interests but recognizing constraints imposed by the government and the existing party landscape.
We begin with direct electoral strategies. We expect that "strong" groups -those that expect to do at least as well in shaping policy via the ballot box as they are currently faring on the battlefield -will prefer to concurrently run their own candidates and fight. We identify groups that expect to do worse adding a direct electoral component compared to a purely violent strategy as "weak."
Strength is a function of organizational cohesion and the existence of a social base that both supports the group and its direct involvement in elections. Most of these groups have networks and even formalized institutions that provide detailed information and robust control, as well as substantial popular appeal. 37 They combine to make groups confident that they can do well in elections because this provides the resources and votes needed to run a successful campaign in which their capacity can be converted into electoral results.
In many cases, groups that expect to secure a sizable share of power running candidates will also be reasonably effective at military operations. There are some exceptions. For example, a highly violent terrorist group with little civilian base may be better at conducting attacks than recruiting votes. We expect groups that will do worse in the polls than in the conflict to not pursue direct strategies, even if they are relatively militarily capable. There is little reason to pursue direct electoral testing if there is little chance of creating political change within mainstream politics. Moreover, there is also typically a minimal threshold of ballot box strength needed to secure sufficient seats, votes, and influence to shift policy in a desired direction.
Groups that have little expected electoral power -whether militarily effective or not -will not have incentives to pursue direct participation. Many small groups will shy away from direct involvement because of the low odds of achieving success through this path. Second, governments may value open direct involvement as a possible pathway toward some form of cooptation, either leading to demobilization or the group acting as an "intrasystemic" player operating within mainstream politics. 42 In contemporary Pakistan, for instance, the military is clearly supporting the "mainstreaming" of the Lashkar-e-Taiba's political front, apparently in an effort to integrate this group into electoral politics. 43 A government may hope that bringing an armed group into the system will give it incentives to prioritize stability, though many prefer to make electoral participation conditional on prior demobilization.
Third, contextual factors can drive variation in the perceived threat from this type of participation for the government. For example, if the number of seats that an armed group can win is relatively limited -such as a group seeking territorial control in a small region with few supporters outside that area -the government may be more inclined to allow it to participate in order to better understand its support in that region and without risking any major change. Initial evidence is consistent with this dimension, as open direct participation is commonly found only among secessionist rebel and terrorist groups. 44 Only in contexts with little risk that an armed group could dominate the government or drastically shift the balance of power do we expect that the government will tolerate participation.
A case in which we can examine the rise of an armed group using overt direct participation is Pakistan's MQM in Karachi, and the dynamics are consistent with the theory.
The MQM's roots are in the All-Pakistan Mohajir Students Organization (APMSO), which formed in the violent campus politics of the late 1970s. 45 The dictatorship of Zia al-Huq transitioned to controlled elections in 1985. The armed APMSO pursued the electoral path, through the MQM, from 1987 as a way to carve out influence against its local rivals and because the political changes of the 1970s had politicized ethnicity in Sindh. 46 As a cohesive, disciplined organization drawing on a newly mobilized constituency, the APMSO/MQM could be confident in its ability to generate electoral power.
Zia's government was open to the new MQM because it provided a useful tool of division in Karachi avoided radical policies, in contrast to Baloch and Bengali insurgent groups in previous decades. The MQM was careful about how it articulated its political demands, making ethno-linguistic and reformist demands that could operate within mainstream distributive politics, rather than a full-scale push for secession. 47 Moreover, its reach was relatively limited, as it primarily competed in Karachi and Hyderabad. When the MQM did step over the Pakistan Army's acceptable "red lines," military crackdowns followed. 48 The MQM maintained its armed wing -violence was useful for attacking rivals, protecting its members, moving into new territory, building lucrative extortion rackets, and gaining leverage over the government. The MQM solidified its status as Karachi's largest political party.
Covert. When the government does not foresee one of these types of benefits outweighing the costs of allowing an armed actor to participation, however, we expect that it will refuse to tolerate overt direct participation. It will ban or legally target parties and candidates openly and unambiguously controlled by the armed group as a result. Armed groups that expect to do well from direct participation turn to a covert strategy when blocked from overt participation. To be covert, the group simply needs to publicly disavow a connection, but the direct aspect occurs when the group does in fact control the party organization. There is a fundamental political difference between knowledge and acknowledgment; 49 in this context, the difference emerges from both governmental response and public opinion. Acknowledgment can lead to bans and backlash, while even tenuous deniability holds at bay, or at least limits, such reactions. 50 This is likely to be a rare outcome: it is difficult to simultaneously control a party and disavow it, especially in the face of a skeptical state apparatus. However, we need more empirical research across cases to uncover the actual incidence of the strategy, and we are able to find several important examples.
We expect governments to ban armed groups that they see as threatening to take a significant share of power via overt involvement. Strong and threatening groups, blocked from overt direct participation, will instead take over existing parties or create party wings that are formally distinct, allowing them to legally and rhetorically distinguish themselves from the actual armed group. Direct control without public acknowledgement is very challenging, requiring a high level of organizational discipline and a leadership skilled at balancing conflicting incentives. The group must still expect to make electoral gains, since running candidates is an electoral test of the group's overall political appeal (and this can often be a relatively open secret with just an assertion of deniability, as further discussed in the case below). Formal separation can satisfy both laws about armed group involvement in election and signal a willingness to abide by the rules of the electoral game to the government. 51 A case that illustrates this covert, direct electoral strategy is the relationship between the PIRA and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s. There is no doubt that the two were in reality formally fused, with key Sinn Fein leaders sitting on the PIRA's Army Council, but the two publicly denied this linkage. This case suggests possible conditions leading to covert direct participation. The Sinn Fein electoral experiment allowed the group to explore mainstream politics, and the British were willing to let it go forward to assess the group's support and to evaluate possible cooptation so long as the link remained deniable.
The PIRA pursued direct participation as it gained confidence in its ability to generate electoral support. would have faced problems blocking a party that was not technically an armed group; moreover, there were benefits similar to toleration for this covert participation similar to those described for overt participation. Most groups linked at all to political violence in Northern Ireland, including
Sinn Fein for a brief time, were blocked at points during the "Troubles." As Sinn Fein moved toward participation, tolerating it denied its supporters "a mild sense of martyrdom." 57 Sands'
win was widely attributed to his personal popularity not any popularity of the group, 58 and so, after his win, the government only banned political prisoners as candidates; after Sinn Fein candidates won in 1982, the government limited its gains through media restrictions. 59 But it remained open to continued electoral participation by Sinn Fein as long as the legal separation from the PIRA continued. Even as the participation is covert, the government still had to tolerate relatively obvious ties. The theory, then, matches some of the reasons for tolerance with overt direct participation: reports vary to some extent about Sinn Fein's electoral support, and Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher reportedly believed that the group's political wing would enter one election, fail to obtain support, and return to a strategy of solely violence, but, even if they were wrong, the losses would have been limited to seats in just one territory and those losses would provide more information about the group.
Explaining Varieties of Indirect Participation
We expect weak groups, with little expectation of electoral success compared to their fighting capacity, to dominate indirect participation. These organizations lack organizational cohesion, a support base for direct electoral involvement, or both. Some groups may be organizationally cohesive but reliant on a limited popular base (these would be highly militaristic groups such as purely terrorist groups) while some groups that draw on substantial popular support are nevertheless challenged by internal fractures that would split or revolt if leaders pursued the electoral path. 60 Even groups strong on one dimension, but weak on another, will face strong incentives to avoid risking direct involvement for fear of failing at the ballot box or being ruptured by internal dissent.
Weak groups pursue indirect participation in an effort to influence policy choices and tilt the electoral playing field. They may succeed, but these successes are likely to be more limited (though often still consequential) than for those groups using direct participation. Incentives will almost never be perfectly aligned between the armed group and the political party/candidate it supports, and the latter will necessarily perform the campaigning and governing tasks that actually produce desired changes. Armed actors will thus have less control over these processes than direct participation. Nevertheless, these relationships can still produce real benefits, and create important permeability between electoral and armed politics. 61 The choice of how armed actors will participate indirectly -covert or overt -hinges on the nature of the mainstream parties running in an election (which can also produce nonparticipation, as discussed below). Covert indirect participation is most likely to occur in support of a political party. Support requires a political party that shares some overlapping aims with the armed group. Such a party simply may not exist, especially for more radical organizations. When it does, however, covert support allows an armed actor to provide backing without triggering legal bans or public opinion backlash against the party, or dissension within the armed group about electoral involvement. Overt indirect participation, by contrast, tends to occur when an armed group differentially targets a party or set of parties for attacks to undermine them in elections. These are parties seen as most threatening and thus needing to be destroyed or weakened. They are often hardline ideological opponents of an armed group or regional parties that advance a peaceful, rival alternative to the armed group's violence. Overtness does not carry the same risks and costs when it comes to attacking a party as it does to supporting a party. The two indirect strategies are not mutually exclusive, since a group can covertly back one party while overtly attacking another, but they are distinct, and each can occur without the other.
There are some cases in which covert indirect strategies actually oppose a group (murky assassination campaigns, for instance) and overt indirect strategies support a group (right-wing militias' backing of rightist parties in Weimar Germany), but we expect the general tendencies to map onto the support/opposition distinction. Future research can unpack when cases occur that do not align with this expectation.
Covert. Indirect covert support tends to be used to support parties that are advancing political goals broadly aligned with those of the armed group. Secret backing is intended to help the party succeed in elections and pursue policies that would help the group's cause. Cadres and money are deployed to help the favored party around elections. For instance, a separatist armed group may secretly back a pro-autonomy party because it believes the party can act as a useful stalking horse within mainstream politics or as one way of testing whether autonomist claims can receive a fair hearing in the mainstream electoral arena. An armed group may also funnel funds to a party that works to overturn extradition or domestic punishment for crimes related to political violence. Covertness is necessary to avoid legal bans and other backlash toward the supported party, as well as to shield the armed group from accusations of betrayal and selling out from within its ranks and support base. This form of participation can be used to pursue a policy goal without causing a loss of face at the polls, legal and public backlash, or internal splintering.
Despite the opacity and ambiguity intrinsic to this strategy, there are cases of indirect covert support that suggest the plausibility of this argument. In Colombia, right-wing paramilitaries have used indirect covert participation at different points in time, reflecting both logics of deniable support for and opposition to "mainstream" candidates/parties. In the late 1990s, right-wing paramilitaries began to conduct systematic campaigns of demobilization and coercion -including "terrorizing voters to vote in particular ways, terrorizing them to stay away from the polls so they could stuff ballots, voting instead of citizens by confiscating their identity cards, terrorizing politicians so that they would not run against their preferred candidates, and manipulating subsequent vote totals electronically" -to assist right-wing parties with which they were aligned.
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The ballot stuffing, vote stealing, and vote total manipulations in Colombia were only part of the supportive participation by the paramilitaries' seeking to affect elections. Politicians could spend less in these districts, funneling cash transfers instead directly to paramilitaries in some cases, according to detailed data on promises made in local fora by the former president.
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In fact, the paramilitaries formalized their policy on such participation, including through discussion at a 2001 meeting, although they kept it secret. 64 In 2002, new third parties emerged that were linked to these groups, and, eventually in 2009, dozens of politicians were arrested for this activity. 65 A downside of this activity, of course, was that once it was revealed, these parties and their elected representatives lost power.
We see similar dynamics in Northeast India. Bhaumik reports that the National Socialist
Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) supported the Democratic Alliance of Nagaland coalition in 2003 and 2008 state elections: "NSCN guerrillas visited villages, asking Nagas to vote for the DAN coalition or face the consequences." 66 In neighboring Manipur, the Governor in 1993 accused "mainstream parties" of being backed by, and linked to, insurgent groups.
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There have been accusations of militants' support for/opposition to mainstream politics in Tripura as well. 68 While internal discussions by these groups are not available, the strategy makes sense in this context. The Indian government has made it clear that it will aggressively block insurgent groups from forming or even indirectly controlling legal political wings without first disarming. Many civilians and fighters in these conflict zones view electoral politics as a corrupt sham. 69 Openly embracing parliamentary politics would be a dangerous strategy for many armed groups in the Northeast, opening them to charges of selling out.
Commented [m5]:
Paul: I could not find this citation.
Overt. Overt indirect participation, by contrast, tends to be aimed at undermining parties that are seen as serious political threats to the armed group's interest. By killing and intimidating politicians and supporters, the goal is to weaken a party's ability to compete electorally.
Overtness is more attractive when opposing than supporting because there will be no legal sanction against a party, or public backlash from appalled voters, resulting from an armed group announcing its targeting of a party. Publicity can signal to the group's supporters to oppose, or even autonomously attack, the targeted party. This strategy may also have the added benefit of potentially coercing preemptive changes that alter the electoral field such as discouraging turnout or even encouraging displacement from areas likely to be targeted. 70 There may be some cases of overt indirect support for a party, but this is likely only in cases where there would be little legal or public backlash against a party as a result of an armed group openly supporting it.
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Parties that are seen as hardline opponents of a group tend to suffer from this targeting strategy, as do regional parties that are loyal to the state can also be targeted by separatists, since they are seen as the most dangerous foes of insurgents due to their local support base.
A classic example of overt indirect participation in an election was the behavior of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Pakistan's 2013 general election. The TTP was a radical antisystemic party. It was ideologically opposed to elections to begin with, and would not have been allowed to run as an armed political party. The lack of direct electoral participation is no surprise given this combination of structure and agency. Yet the TTP was not indifferent to electoral outcomes, since some rulers and ruling coalitions appeared more likely to seriously resist its aims than others. The TTP vigorously opposed the Awami National Party, the MQM, and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). 72 Each represented an ideological obstacle to its Islamizing agenda. The ANP stood for a Pashtun nationalism; the MQM advanced a strongly anti-TTP, secular agenda in Karachi, a city with a large and growing Pashtun population, and the PPP is traditionally the most leftist and secular of the parties. 73 The TTP publicly warned against attending these parties' rallies and aggressively targeted them.
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The TTP, despite its distaste for electoral politics, also sought to shift the electoral balance toward Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf, which were largely allowed to operate as usual by the TTP. 75 While there is a potential dimension of covert indirect participation, in the form of allegations of a possible a secret deal between the PML-N and TTP, 76 the TTP targeting of the ANP, MQM, and PPP's rallies, workers, and candidates was clear and consistent. 77 This was a violent campaign trying to tip the electoral balance against particularly dangerous parties, without necessarily actively supporting its mainstream rivals.
Explaining Nonparticipation
Sometimes groups ignore elections or target all electoral actors as part of their campaign against the state without discrimination. If the elections are expected to be at least somewhat competitive (i.e. occur within our scope conditions), such behavior would be considered nonparticipation. It is essential to empirically distinguish nonparticipation from electoral strategies and to explore why groups might pursue this approach. We focus on discrimination in targeting/support strategy. Direct participation is relatively easy to distinguish from nonparticipation, but indirect strategies can be more difficult. If there is clear evidence that armed actors are trying to differentially allocate their violence or backing between mainstream political actors, this is suggestive of an electoral strategy.
Nonparticipation can occur for several reasons. First, it may be an involuntary outcome on the part of the group if the state is so strong that it can detect and block any links between an armed actor and a political party. This is possible and may occur in extremely high-capacity contexts, but is difficult to achieve in most of the contexts where we see substantial armed group activity. 78 Second, armed groups themselves may decide to avoid participation, even if it is a possibility. This is likely when the elections do not involve cleavages that would create a space in the party system for an armed group's candidates and/or parties advancing political demands that are relevant to an armed group. If the group's political goals are orthogonal to the main dimensions of contestation in a political system, there is no reason for a group to directly deploy candidates, indirectly to try to influence policy, or tilt the electoral playing field. This will be most common in two situations. The first is with highly radical armed groups that have no plausible allies or path forward in mainstream politics. For a group seeking to build a theocracy, undermining the mainstream center-right party, for instance, would only yield a mainstream center-left ruling government equally committed to blocking theocracy. This was the logic of the JVP's 1989 turn to total war against the entire Sri Lankan political spectrum: there were no truly revolutionary parties in mainstream politics, and so the entire system needed to be overthrown.
In another example, Al-Qaeda in Iraq/Islamic State (AQI/IS) in Iraq did not try to bolster support for Sunni parties against Shia parties in Iraqi elections because Sunni parties were relatively moderate and unlikely to pursue the overhaul of the system that the group deemed essential to its cause. Instead, it spent many of its resources targeting as many political candidates as it could, from various parties, as part of a purely military strategy.
Similarly, peripheral groups pursuing political causes entirely irrelevant to national political competition have little incentive to try to participate. These groups can, of course, provoke policy changes by the system as a whole, such as an overreaction to an attack that results in the termination of rights and, potentially then, broader uprising -but these are common armed tactics, not participation campaigns. 79 We expect such groups to boycott, ignore, or indiscriminately target parties and supporters in electoral politics. and so the ULFA supported the AGP through the 1990s. 86 The AGP eventually distanced itself from ULFA, however, and the armed group again focused exclusively on insurgent operations.
Future Research and Policy Considerations
Elections are a hugely important means of determining who holds political power -including in contexts of civil war and "armed politics." 87 Armed actors are often forced to decide how to deal with the parties, candidates, and electoral processes that determine who will control government policy. Even groups that are ideologically hostile to democracy cannot ignore the stakes of electoral competition, and many see opportunities to advance their interests through mainstream politics. This creates a fascinating spectrum of armed group relationships with the electoral arena. This article has conceptualized these strategies and begun to theorize their roots, opening a new research agenda on how democratic practice works in the absence of a state monopoly of violence.
Understanding how armed groups choose electoral strategies has the potential to contribute to several important debates. First, it will help political scientists think more carefully about the links between violence, on the one hand, and regular politics, on the other. Conflict and elections often are not distinct, primarily in the contemporary developing world, 88 but also in advanced industrial democracies. 89 Recent work suggests that the majority of elections are contentious, and that many involve violence or its threat, producing this institutional coevolution over time. 90 Second, studying the blending of violence and voting will advance our thinking about whether these tactics truly are substitutes, and whether groups see them as such. 91 It could further develop our understanding of how conflict affects democratization, and how democratization affects conflict. 92 Third, examining elections in this context will contribute to the study of strategies that armed actors use beyond violence. Armed groups can provide public or club goods and engage in local governance, 93 but they do much more than this. Understanding why groups make these choices is important in its own right, and it may also inform their armed campaigns. 94 There are several important directions for future research. First, we need extensive new empirical research to systematically measure the varieties of armed group involvement in elections. This is a major, and daunting, task because of the subtleties and ambiguities that accompany several of the strategies: indirect and covert strategies are particularly difficult to measure. This approach would build on complementarities between case-specific work and cross-context comparisons.
Second, there are subtleties to electoral strategies that we have not fully explored. Some armed groups may pursue overt involvement as a way of trying to hide their more maximal aims; in turn, governments may strategically try to coopt, expose, or infiltrate these actors by allowing participation. Furthermore, we have identified some cases of change in strategy over time, and the learning and adaptation over time that accompanies these changes deserves further study.
Third, the role of participation and public opinion in driving these dynamics demands further research. While we have mixed evidence on exposure to violence and electoral participation such as voting, 95 we do not know enough about how citizens form attitudes toward armed groups participating in various ways in elections. 96 Governments try to evaluate how their constituents feel about armed group electoral participation, shaping their responses, and armed groups do the same. 97 Unobtrusive survey measures, during and after conflict, may be useful in such studies. 98 Understanding citizen attitudes about armed group electoral participation is a fascinating area for future work.
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly moving forward, we have not systematically considered the consequences of these strategies. Key issues at stake include how successful armed groups are at achieving their goals, the implications of different strategies for how resources are distributed, who wins elections, and what happens to armed groups after participating. At the broadest level, future work needs to assess the implications for governance and democratic stability of armed groups becoming involved in elections: it leads to cooptation and order in some contexts, but escalating violence and disorder in others.
This article offers several insights into managing militarized electoral contexts. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, for instance, many parties are linked to armed groups, and understanding how this may affect stability in these developing electoral systems is crucial.
Strong armed groups have the greatest capacity to undermine political order, but also potentially the strongest incentives to pursue electoral involvement because of the benefits they may be able to reap. Carefully structuring their incentives, and constraints, is essential for managing such organizations. International and domestic pressure can be applied to governments to help shape the response.
Yet it is important to also keep in mind that even overt direct participation is no panacea for producing peace; instead, many groups continue to use violence even while being deeply engaged in electoral politics. Policymakers and analysts should not expect a straightforward path from electoral involvement to demobilization; instead, they should anticipate a continuing 
